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Abstract
Internet experiments are a new and convenient way for reaching a
large subject pool. Yet, providing incentives to subjects can be a tricky
design issue. One cost￿ e⁄ective and simple method is the publication
of a high score (as in computer games).We test whether a high score
provides adequate and non￿ distortionary incentives by comparing it to
the usual performance based incentives. We ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences
and conclude that high scores are not always appropriate as an incen-
tive device. Performance based ￿nancial incentives seem to be required
also in internet experiments.
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Experiments on the internet have become more and more frequent in recent
years.1 Using the internet has some obvious advantages. It is a relatively
inexpensive way of reaching many subjects. It allows to broaden the subjects
pool beyond the standard undergraduate student population. In addition,
decision making at one￿ s own PC at home or in the o¢ ce is arguably a more
natural setting than that in the laboratory. It resembles an environment
that is familiar to many people, e.g. from home banking.
However, experimenting on the internet also poses a number of new
challenges. In this note we will focus on one such problem, namely the
way incentives are provided to subjects. In experimental economics, stan-
dard procedures require that subjects receive adequate incentives. Although
usually those incentives are provided through cash payments, other incen-
tives are being used (e.g. grades, lottery tickets for non￿ cash prizes, etc.).
For obvious reasons, the distribution of cash is di¢ cult and/or expensive in
large￿ scale internet experiments. Furthermore, often an experimenter wants
to collect data anonymously, which can nicely be done via the internet. Yet,
to preserve anonymity one does not want pay subjects directly because such
payment requires knowing the subject￿ s identity (e.g. name plus postal ad-
dress or the bank account number). It would thus be desirable if other
incentives schemes could be found that would provide adequate incentives
but would not distort results.
We consider here one such incentive scheme that is well known from
computer games (or for the older of us, from pinball machines), the high
score. The high score is simply a list of top performers (i.e. usually their
initials or nicknames) with their associated score or payo⁄. The idea is that
subjects are inherently motivated to achieve a top placement on this list. If
this were true, the high score would be a very cost-e⁄ective and simple way
1For experiments that have been conducted over the internet, see e.g., Forsythe et
al. (1992, 1999), Lucking-Reiley (1999), Shavit et al. (2001), Bosch-Domenech et al.
(2002), G￿th et al. (2003), Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and Drehmann et al. (2005, 2007).
Greiner et al. (2002), Anderhub et al. (2001), and Charness et al. (2007) contain detailed
discussions of methodological issues.
1of providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments.
We test the hypothesis that a high score provides adequate and non￿
distortionary incentives by comparing subjects￿behavior in an internet ex-
periment with behavior of subjects in a laboratory where we provide various
forms of incentives. Incentives in the lab range from the usual performance
pay over ￿xed payments to no payment at all. All incentive schemes in the
lab are supplemented through a high score.
Our main ￿ndings are that results obtained with a high score di⁄er
signi￿cantly from those obtained with the usual cash incentives. This holds
independently of whether the experiment is run on the internet or in the
laboratory.
2 Experimental design
More than 700 subjects participated in a simple experiment with the struc-
ture of a Cournot duopoly. Table 1 provides a summary of the four ex-
perimental treatments.2 The bulk of the experiment was conducted as an
internet experiment (setting net). In net, subjects played on the internet,
in a location of their own choice (home, o¢ ce etc.), and at their own pace.
The only incentives for subject was the chance to be listed on a high score
table, which publicly displayed on our webpage the score and the chosen
nickname of each player.3
Additionally, there were three di⁄erent laboratory experiments with var-
ious forms of monetary incentives, which were designed to bridge the gap
between net and a standard laboratory experiment. Closest to net was
setting lab-np, in which subjects played in the laboratory but without any
monetary incentives.4 As in net, the only incentive was the high score table.
Thus, the only di⁄erence between the two treatments was the environment,
that is, laboratory versus subjects￿homes or o¢ ces. Next in line was setting
2See the online appendix for more details about the experimental design, instructions,
and screen shots.
3For some subjects getting the top-spot on a high score table presents substantial
incentives. For at least one subject the incentive was so great that he or she invested
su¢ cient time to hack our system, and tried to manipulate the high score table.
4Subjects in lab-np were ￿rst year students taking part in a campus tour.
2lab-f, in which additional to the high score table, subjects received a ￿xed
payment of 10 euros as soon as they entered the lab.5 Finally, setting lab
was the usual laboratory experiment in which subjects were paid according
to the sum of their pro￿ts. A high score table was displayed in addition.
The instructions for all settings were the same up to the incentive structure.
At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to ￿ll in a questionnaire
with some demographic data.6
Table 1: Summary of experimental treatments
treatment setting incentives # of subjects
net internet high score 550
lab-np laboratory high score 55
lab-f laboratory high score + ￿xed payment 50
lab laboratory high score + performance pay 50
The game played in the experiment was a standard symmetric Cournot
duopoly with linear inverse demand function maxf109￿Q;0g and constant
marginal cost of 1. Each player￿ s quantity qi, i = 1;2 was an element of the
discrete set of actions f0;1;:::;109;110g. Player i￿ s pro￿t function was given
by
￿(qi;q￿i) := (maxf109 ￿ qi ￿ q￿i;0g ￿ 1)qi: (1)
Given this payo⁄ function, it is straightforward to compute the Nash equi-
librium, which is at q1 = q2 = 36. Subjects played the Cournot duopoly re-
peatedly for 40 rounds with the same opponent. Each subject was matched
against a computer that was programmed to one of a number of standard
learning algorithms. Subjects were told that they play against a computer
but they received no further information about the algorithm. Computers
were programmed to play according to noisy versions of one of the following
decision rules: Best-response, ￿ctitious play, imitate the best, reinforcement
5In principle, subjects could have left the lab after receiving the 10 euros but no one
did.
6Subjects were able to repeat the experiment (see Duersch et al., 2008). However, for
the current paper we only use data from the ￿rst round in order to eliminate any learning
e⁄ects.
3learning or trial & error.7
3 Results
Table 2 summarizes the main variables of interest, namely mean quantities
of subjects and the average of their total pro￿ts. Note ￿rst that there are
no signi￿cant di⁄erences for either quantities or pro￿ts between net, lab-np,
and lab-f at any conventional level of signi￿cance of a two￿ sided Mann￿
Whitney U test. The average quantities in net, lab-np, and lab-f are almost
the same at about 48 whereas in lab average quantity is only 43.14.8 All
pairwise di⁄erence between net, lab-np, and lab-f on the one hand and lab on
the other hand are signi￿cant at the 1% level. For lab, we also ￿nd higher
total pro￿ts than in all three other treatments although this di⁄erence is
not signi￿cant (see however the regression results below where we ￿nd a
signi￿cant di⁄erence).
Table 2: Summary statistics
treatment quantities (std. deviations) pro￿ts (std. deviations)
net 48.69 (10.76) 40,283.4 (16,894.1)
lab-np 48.85 (12.09) 40,579.9 (16,955.0)
lab-f 48.21 (10.56) 39,856.4 (16,806.3)
lab 43.14 (7.42) 44,632.6 (13,480.4)
Note: ￿Quantities￿are averages over subjects and rounds. ￿Pro￿ts￿are the mean
of total pro￿ts across subjects. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Con￿rming ￿ndings by Anderhub et al. (2001) and Shavit et al. (2001),
variances on the net are higher than in lab (F￿ test, p < 0:05) for both,
quantities and pro￿ts. However, this also seems to be driven by incentives
as variances in lab-np and lab-f are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those in
net.
The di⁄erences in mean quantities between lab and net can be summa-
7See our companion paper for details about the learning processes (Duersch et al.
2008).
8In a di⁄erent context, Shavit et al. (2001) ￿nd that bids in a lottery evaluation task
are signi￿cantly higher on the internet than in a classroom experiment.
4rized as follows.9
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The ￿rst arrow indicates a signi￿cant increase in quantities between lab
and lab-f. The next two arrows indicate that there are no signi￿cant di⁄er-
ences at any conventional level between lab-f, lab-np, and net. We conclude
that the di⁄erence between lab and net is primarily driven by the lack of
monetary incentives in net and probably less so by the environment of the
decision maker (internet vs. laboratory).10 Most importantly, given that
even in the laboratory, there are substantial and highly signi￿cant di⁄er-
ences in average quantities between lab and lab-f, we can reject the hypoth-
esis that a high score provides adequate and non￿ distortionary incentives
for all decision tasks.
For a more detailed look at the data, we ran OLS regressions to explain
average quantities of subjects and average total pro￿ts (see Table 3). Con-
￿rming the MWU￿ tests above, Table 3 shows that average quantities in lab
are signi￿cantly lower than in net (at the 1% level). But now also average
pro￿ts are signi￿cantly higher in net. Again, there is no signi￿cant di⁄er-
ence for average quantities or pro￿ts between net, lab-f, and lab-np. These
e⁄ects are robust to inclusion of the learning algorithms the subjects were
matched against and the starting values of the computer. Interestingly, fe-
male subjects tend to choose lower quantities. Finally, it is reassuring that
subjects with some training in economics and researchers obtained signi￿-
cantly higher pro￿ts.
4 Conclusion
Our experiment provides some methodological lessons with respect to inter-
net experiments. The option of providing incentives through a high score
9The p￿ values shown in parentheses refer to subjects￿mean quantities using a two￿ sided
Mann-Whitney U test, treating each subject as one observation.
10For the latter conclusion to hold, we make the (probably not too implausible) as-
sumption that the marginal e⁄ect of providing monetary incentives is the same in the
laboratory and on the internet.
5Table 3: OLS regressions
dependent variable:
avg. quantity avg. total pro￿t
lab ￿4:68￿￿￿ (1:69) 4594￿￿ (1941)
lab-f ￿1:00 (2:87) 893 (3299)
lab-np ￿1:62 (2:82) ￿1249 (3251)
economics ￿1:49 (1:00) 3375￿￿￿ (1147)
game theory ￿2:10￿ (1:18) ￿461 (1358)
researcher ￿1:63 (1:41) 3332￿￿ (1615)
female ￿2:57￿￿￿ (0:92) ￿484 (1056)
best reply 3:30￿￿￿ (1:22) 10261￿￿￿ (1405)
￿ctitious play ￿2:45￿￿ (1:21) 8960￿￿￿ (1397)
imitation ￿1:98 (1:25) ￿22280￿￿￿ (1433)
trial & error 1:00 (1:25) 3558￿￿ (1432)
start 35 ￿0:17 (1:03) 1816 (1181)
start 45 ￿0:99 (1:14) ￿842 (1309)
constant 70:45￿￿￿ (11:33) 26258￿￿ (13017)
Observations 705 705
adj. R2 0:07 0:49
Note: ￿￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%-level;￿￿ signi￿cant at 5%-level; ￿ signi￿cant at 10%-
level; Standard errors in parentheses. Explanatory variables are dummies for the
experimental setting (lab, lab-f, lab-np) with net the default, dummies for whether
subjects had any training in economics or game theory, dummy for subjects who are
researchers, dummies for female subjects, and dummies for the learning algorithm
(best reply, ￿ctitious play, imitation, trial & error, with reinforcement as default),
and dummies for the starting value of the computer (35 or 45 with 40 as default).
6table seems attractive since it is inexpensive and reduces the organizational
burden on the experimenter. However, we show in this experiment that
results obtained with a high score di⁄er signi￿cantly from those obtained
with the usual cash incentives. This holds independently of whether the
experiment is run on the internet or in the laboratory. For future (internet)
experiments, we would thus suggest the use of signi￿cant and performance
based ￿nancial incentives.11
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8Appendix (not intended for publication)
A Details of the experimental design
The action space for all computer types was f0;1;:::;109g. All computer types
require an exogenously set choice for the ￿rst round as they can only condition on
past behavior of subjects. Starting quantities in net were 35, 40, and 45, which
were switched automatically every 50 subjects in order to collect approximately
the same number of observations for each starting quantity. Starting quantities of
computers in the laboratory were always 40.
Recruitment was done by email, newsgroups, and a University of Bonn student
magazine. In setting lab, subjects played in the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental
Economics. Incentives were provided by paying subjects immediately at the end of
the experiment the sum of pro￿ts over all rounds according to an exchange rate of
9000 Points to 1 euro. On average, subjects earned 10.17 euros for about half an
hour in the lab.
The sequence of events was as follows. After logging in (after entering the
laboratory, respectively), subjects were randomly matched to a computer type.
The computer type was displayed to subjects via a label (Greek letters) though
subjects were not told how computer types were associated with labels. In the
instructions (see below) subjects were told the following: ￿The other ￿rm is always
played by a computer program. The computer uses a ￿xed algorithm to calculate
its output which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your
output from the current round before making its decision.￿
A page with instructions was displayed to subjects. At any time during the
experiment, subjects were able read the instructions and an example for calculat-
ing pro￿ts by opening a separate window on their computer. After reading the
instructions, subjects could input their quantity for the ￿rst round. The computer
displayed a new window with the results for the current round including the number
of the round, the subject￿ s quantity, the subject￿ s pro￿t, the computer￿ s quantity
as well as the computer￿ s pro￿t (see Appendix B for screenshots). A subject had
to acknowledge this information before moving on to the following round. Upon
acknowledgment, a new page appeared with an input ￿eld for the new quantity.
9This page also showed a table with the history of previous round(s)￿ s quantities
and pro￿ts for both players.
After round 40, subjects were asked to ￿ll in a brief questionnaire (see below)
with information on gender, occupation, country of origin, formal training in game
theory or economic theory, previous participation in online experiments, and the
free format question ￿Please explain in a few words how you made your decisions￿ .
It was possible to skip this questionnaire.
The high score was displayed on the following page. This table contained a
ranking among all previous subjects, separately for subjects who were matched
against the same computer type and for all subjects. It also contained the com-
puter￿ s score.
B Instructions
B.1 Introduction Page Internet
Welcome to our experiment!
Please take your time to read this short introduction. The experiment lasts for
40 rounds. At the end, there is a high score showing the rankings of all participants.
You represent a ￿rm which produces and sells a certain product. There is one
other ￿rm that produces and sells the same product. You must decide how much
to produce in each round. The capacity of your factory allows you to produce
between 0 and 110 units each round. Production costs are 1 per unit. The price
you obtain for each sold unit may vary between 0 and 109 and is determined as
follows. The higher the combined output of you and the other ￿rm, the lower the
price. To be precise, the price falls by 1 for each additional unit supplied. The
pro￿t you make per unit equals the price minus production cost of 1. Note that
you make a loss if the price is 0. Your pro￿t in a given round equals the pro￿t per
unit times your output, i.e. pro￿t = (price 1) * Your output. Please look for an
example here. At the beginning of each round, all prior decisions and pro￿ts are
shown. The other ￿rm is always played by a computer program. The computer
uses a ￿xed algorithm to calculate its output which may depend on a number of
things but it cannot observe your output from the current round before making its
decision. Your pro￿ts from all 40 rounds will be added up to calculate your high
10score. There is an overall high score and a separate one for each type of computer.
Please do not use the browser buttons (back, forward) during the game, and do not
click twice on the go button, it may take a short while.
Choose new quantity
Please choose an integer (whole number) between 0 and 110.
B.2 Introduction Page lab
Welcome to our experiment!
Please take your time to read this short introduction. The experiment lasts
for 40 rounds. Money in the experiment is denominated in Taler (T). At the end,
exchange your earnings into euro at a rate of 9.000 Taler = 1 euro. You represent
a ￿rm which produces and sells a certain product. There is one other ￿rm that
produces and sells the same product. You must decide how much to produce in
each round. The capacity of your factory allows you to produce between 0 and 110
units each round. Production cost are 1T per unit. The price you obtain for each
sold unit may vary between 0 T and 109 T and is determined as follows. The higher
the combined output of you and the other ￿rm, the lower the price. To be precise,
the price falls by 1T for each additional unit supplied. The pro￿t you make per unit
equals the price minus production cost of 1T. Note that you make a loss if the price
is 0. Your pro￿t in a given round equals the pro￿t per unit times your output, i.e.
pro￿t = (price 1) * Your output. Please look for an example here. At the beginning
of each round, all prior decisions and pro￿ts are shown. The other ￿rm is always
played by a computer program. The computer uses a ￿xed algorithm to calculate
its output which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your
output from the current round before making its decision. Your pro￿ts from all 40
rounds will be added up to calculate your total earnings. Please do not use the
browser buttons (back, forward) during the game, and do not click twice on the go
button, it may take a short while.
Choose new quantity
Please choose an integer (whole number) between 0 and 110.
11B.3 Example Page
The Formula
The pro￿t in each round is calculated according to the following formula:
Pro￿t = (Price 1) * Your Output
The price, in turn, is calculated as follows.
Price = 109 Combined Output
That is, if either you or the computer raises the output by 1, the price falls
by 1 for both of you. (but note that the price cannot become negative). And the
combined output is simply:
Combined Output = Your Output + Computers Output
Example:
Lets say your output is 20, and the computers output is 40. Hence, combined
output is 60 and the price would be 49 (= 109 - 60). Your pro￿t would be (49 1)*20
= 960. The computers pro￿t would be (49 - 1)*40 = 1920. Now assume you raise
your output to 30, while the computer stays at 40. The new price would be 39 ( =
109-40-30). Your pro￿t would be (39 - 1)*30 = 1140. The computers pro￿t would
be (39 - 1)*40 = 1520.
To continue, please close this window.
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